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Abstract: For thousands of years, our ancestors operated a pension system that modern economists have 
declared obsolete, and which a new system has been introduced to replace. However, this new system is 
beginning to go bankrupt, while the maintaining of the old by the young is increasingly becoming a battle 
between generations. In other words, the modern pension system – it would seem – has not solved, but 
exacerbated the pension problem. But the old principle can still be applied, since the upcoming generation 
does not maintain future pensioners for nothing. Future transfers to the latter by the young have been 
preceded by transfers from that older generation towards the young. This means that the elderly are justified 
in demanding a pension from the young, but only those to whom the young owe a debt, and only to the extent 
of that debt. Having recognised this, we can lay the foundations for a new pension system based on the 
equitable settling of accounts between generations, which in principle will be similar to the old system, but 
which provides solutions that are more characteristic of the modern system.
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Introduction
The economics of pensions seems simple and logical, but it is problematic because we can 
derive from the situation that we may leave a huge (equal to some years’ GDP) pension 
debt for (perhaps yet unborn) children and grandchildren, which can also be interpreted 
as meaning that greedy old people are exploiting the young. Furthermore, the whole 
pension system and the pension economics that support/explain it are a very new 
phenomenon – a product of the twentieth century. Before this time there was no system 
of this kind, although pension-like solutions did exist. But these earlier solutions did 
not produce the contradictions that the present system does. So the obvious question 
arises: is it inevitable that the system should function in this way? It is only possible to 
establish this type of modern pension system along the same principles? Or are only 
funded pension systems reliable, and should we forget about pay-as-you-go systems?
1 The article is based on the paper presented at the "Institutional reforms in ageing societies” conference, Budapest 8-9 June 2017
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Examination of the topic in detail suggests that traditional pension-like solutions 
provide the key to present-day problems. Such systems were well designed: parents 
brought up their children (i.e. they provided them with quantifiable transfers), 
and children supported their ageing parents (i.e. they gave back these transfers via 
reverse transfers).
In the present pension system, it is very peculiar that the problem is formulated 
in such a way that the elderly are ‘exploiting the young’. It is strange because the most 
important ‘capital’ of young people – their knowledge and abilities – were established 
with the financial help (and other transfers) of older people. So it is logical to make 
a settlement between the two parties, and one possible type of the latter involves a 
kind of contribution payment on the part of young people. However, in exchange for 
this contribution, young people should not apply for any reimbursement (e.g. in the 
form of a pension) later in time if they receive this contribution in advance during 
their childhood. In other worlds, an early contribution payment is not commensurate 
with any right to a later pension. Such payments must go directly to those who 
contributed to the investment in the human capital that created this capacity for a 
contribution payment in the form of a pension. Thus, if somebody wishes to receive 
a pension, they can follow one of two paths (or a combination of these): 1. make an 
investment into human capital (i.e. bring up children) or 2. accumulate ‘material’ 
capital. In other words, youth should not be expected to maintain all old people, 
but only those who have contributed to their upbringing and through whose efforts 
the human capital they possess came into existence, and only to the same extent. 
Approaching the issue from this perspective, the pension system could represent 
nothing other than a kind of equitable settling of accounts between the generations.
Increasing burdens on younger generations
According to UN forecasts, by the end of the century the global population will 
increase such that the proportion of the population that is (now) regarded as old will 
also increase dynamically, almost tripling compared to the current level. Developed 
countries are expected to undergo a similarly proportionate increase, but beginning 
from a much higher level. The percentage of old people will increase from the current 
level of around 18% to almost 30%.
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Figure 1: Projected global population aged sixty-five and over
Source: UN, World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision - https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/
Interpolated/
If we regard the pay-as-you-go pensions systems that are in place in the majority 
of developed countries as a given, then the financing of pensions will increase the 
burden on the youth of today and future generations.
However, the problem of having to maintain an increasing number of old 
people will not only be felt with regard to pensions, but also by the healthcare 
system. Here too, the healthcare of old people is usually financed from the taxes 
and contributions paid into the system by active workers. We are not in possession 
of dependable forecasts with regard to changes in healthcare expenditure, but it is 
easy to develop a picture based on the figures below. The proportion of GDP being 
spent on healthcare, although starting at different levels and to various degrees, is 
continuously increasing throughout the world.
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Figure 2: Health expenditure total, % of GDP
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Health Expenditure - http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS
Ageing has presumably already played a major role in this increase, and these healthcare 
costs are expected to increase further as a result of ageing, in view of the fact that – according 
to OECD data – healthcare expenditure gradually increases with age (OECD [2016]).
Figure 3: Share and per capita health spending by age group in some OECD countries2
2 Please note that Figure 3 is taken directly from OECD (2016).
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In summary, if we take the current financing solutions as given, providing for the 
old will increase the burden on younger generations.
Social contract between generations
However, the fact that the proportion of old people is increasing, and that of younger 
generation decreasing, will not necessarily lead to an increase in the burden for younger 
generations. Things could happen in exactly the opposite manner: young people 
become more valued as they become rarer, leading to an increase in their incomes, 
while older people fall into poverty en masse. Poverty in old age is not a particularly rare 
phenomenon during the course of history, and presumably this trend will appear again 
in future. However, this tendency is expected to be much weaker than it otherwise 
could be, or rather used to be, within the developed world thanks to the fact that a 
social contract3 was concluded between the age groups two or three generations ago. 
The essence of this Hobbes-Rousseau social contract, as it was called and set down in 
writing (Samuelson [1958]) by its main ideologist Paul Samuelson, and which includes 
all generations, including those as yet unborn, is that currently active workers forego 
part of their income for the benefit of the current older generation, and in exchange, 
the active workers of the future will also forego part of their income for their benefit 
when they also become old. This kind of social contract (which replaced an earlier, 
non-functioning version) was first concluded during the era of the New Deal, became 
universally popular following the Second World War, and became the modern system 
of social security. It has two important functions: assuring income in old age (pension 
system), and financing healthcare in old age (health insurance). A third system aimed 
at financing nursing in old age is also beginning to gain in popularity in some developed 
countries (such as Germany and Japan).
The younger generation’s possible counter-strategies
As a result of the above-mentioned worsening demographic tendencies and the social 
contract currently in effect, the younger generation of today (and future generations) 
must transfer an increasing proportion of their income to the old people of today 
(and future generations of old people). It is logical that they regard this as unfair and 
are fighting against it. What other possibilities exist? From this perspective, it is 
worth distinguishing between individual and collective strategies.
The essence of the individual strategy is that young people attempt to reduce the 
pressure on their income that results from ageing. This again may take two forms: 
3 Here I have adopted the metaphor of Samuelson [1958] as the whole pension profession did. Hobbes and Rousseau introduced 
the concept of the “social contract” in relation to power, but the logical structure is as follows: social classes behave as if there is 
a valid explicit contract between them, albeit they may not be conscious of it. Samuelson generalised the term “social contract” 
in this sense, replacing social classes with generations. In this sense, the pension system gives the impression that there is a 
contract between consecutive generations. The epithet “Hobbes-Rousseau” was used by Samuelson and was adopted by the 
present author, not considering that the issue was discussed widely after the two original creators of the phrase.
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direct and indirect. The direct strategy is aimed at ensuring that individuals need 
transfer as little as possible to the older generation, while people who adopt the 
indirect strategy accept this fact, but strive to reduce other burdens to compensate.
The third option, a collective strategy, is to fight to create a new social contract 
between generations.
Direct individual strategies
As a result of the whitening of the grey and black economies, it will presumably 
become increasingly difficult to find loopholes by which to avoid paying taxes and 
social security contributions. Accordingly, the most effective direct individual 
counter-strategy to reduce public burdens is emigration, and this phenomenon may 
indeed be observed from the periphery of the European Union towards its centre. 
One such example is Hungary, from where emigration towards the more developed 
countries of the EU is continuously increasing (see Gödri [2015]4).
Figure 4: Annual outflow of Hungarian citizens to EGT countries according to “mirror” and 
Hungarian statistics 
Source: Gödri [2015], including: a) Eurostat (2015.05.25) from 2009, complemented by German (DESTATIS) and Austrian 
(Statistik Austria) data, and Gödri’s own calculation; b) HCSO, Demographic Yearbook.
4 The table primarily indicates the change and rough order of magnitude of the trend, because it was only possible to partially 
supplement missing Eurostat data – Irén Gödri, personal communication.
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Furthermore, this primarily involves the younger working generation:
Table 1: Distribution of emigrants from Hungary according to various socio-demographic 
factors compared to the resident population of Hungary aged 25 to 59 (%) 
Age at time of 
emigration
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 living in 
Hungary
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated after 
1989
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated between 
1990 and 2009
Hungarian citizens 
aged 20-59 who 
emigrated after 
2009
Under 20 – 4 7 2
20-29 – 51 55 48
30-39 – 29 27 31
40-49 – 11 9 14
50-59 – 4 2 6
20-39 in total 80 82 79
Source: Blaskó-Gödri (2014)
Naturally, in moderately developed economies like Hungary’s and those of similar 
countries, the high level of public burdens on income is only one of the reasons 
for emigration; the more important reason is the actual level of wages, or rather 
the significant increase that can be achieved through emigrating to a more highly 
developed country. It may also be observed, however, that one-way emigration also 
occurs between more highly developed countries: highly trained young people from 
certain countries are escaping high levels of tax and social security contributions 
(or an overly balanced pay scale) to countries that rake in lower public taxes (or that 
provide particularly high salaries to highly trained workers). Germany is often cited 
as one such country. Official statistics indicate that, during the past decade or so, the 
balance of migration with regard to German nationals (i.e. people born in Germany), 
which has always been positive (meaning that the “homeland” attracted people of 
German origin living abroad), has become negative.
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Figure 5: Migration between Germany and foreign countries
Source: Destatis - https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/Migration/Tables/MigrationTotal.html
According to data from Eurostat, German citizens who emigrate are generally 
members of the younger generation, and presumably also their children. Some 
three-quarters of emigrants are younger than forty-five years of age.5
5 As we can see, Destatis and Eurostat figures contain a discrepancy with regard to the total number of emigrants. The probable 
reason for this is that the two institutions use different definitions, meaning that, to a certain extent, Eurostat “cleanses” the 
German data they receive - according to Irén Gödri.
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Table 2: Emigration by age group, gender and citizenship - Germany (former territory of the 
FRG until 1990)
Age 
group
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
0-15 23 237 24 710 : 29 299 31 557 22 460 21 629 22 220 19 405 19 185 19 298 17 989
15-19 6 191 6 314 : 6 966 7 139 4 562 4 198 3 679 3 280 3 373 3 737 3 411
20-24 16 202 14 433 : 15 133 16 258 8 655 8 928 8 547 7 533 8 010 8 957 8 224
25 - 29 19 971 19 830 : 23 121 25 828 17 073 16 508 15 664 14 290 14 774 17 559 17 415
30 - 34 18 437 17 200 : 19 470 20 944 15 130 14 634 15 607 13 807 14 388 15 739 15 095
35 - 39 19 481 17 888 : 17 955 17 591 12 361 10 749 10 777 10 094 10 598 11 789 11 067
40 - 44 15 155 14 233 : 15 927 17 289 11 548 10 003 9 632 8 189 7 909 8 327 7 262
45 - 49 9 818 9 563 : 11 197 12 857 9 392 8 272 8 340 7 727 7 806 8 101 7 372
50 - 54 7 060 6 431 : 7 154 8 124 5 821 5 548 5 658 5 256 5 664 6 457 6 042
55 - 59 4 640 4 415 : 4 772 5 573 3 989 3 447 3 572 3 473 3 725 4 062 3 788
60 - 64 4 518 3 822 : 3 550 3 929 3 146 2 854 2 967 2 786 2 824 3 102 2 940
Total
150 
667
144 
815
155 
290
161 
105
174 
759
120 
374
112 
303
112 
049
101 
384
104 
245
113 
884
106 
682
0-44
118 
674
114 
608
0
127 
871
136 
606
91 789 86 649 86 126 76 598 78 237 85 406 80 463
0-44 
- %
79% 79% 79% 78% 76% 77% 77% 76% 75% 75% 75%
Source: Eurostat - http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
It is important to note that these are the official statistics, which presumably 
underestimate the actual level of migration; in the case of Hungary, mirror statistics 
indicate that only about a third of actual migration appears in the official statistics.
One of the disadvantages of this strategy is that if young people escape from the 
country that raises them – and from their exploitation by the older generation who 
live there – by emigrating, then this will only mean that they will be using their 
contributions to support complete strangers; people from whom they did not receive 
a thing when they were children, instead of their parents. However, according to 
the current pension philosophy defined by Samuelson this is perfectly normal, 
and is something we need not worry about. (In fact, two years ago, the director of 
Germany’s state insurance organisation explicitly stressed this – citing the current 
pension philosophy – in relation to Hungarian claims that it is unfair that young 
Hungarians who emigrate should pay contributions that benefit German pensioners, 
instead of their own parents’ pensions.)
Indirect individual strategies
If an increasing proportion of a person’s income is deducted in the form of public 
burdens such as social security contributions to support old people, it is logical that 
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they will attempt to reduce their expenses in other areas so as not to have to reduce 
consumption.6 The most logical step in this respect is if they reduce the costs relating 
to raising children by only having one child, or not having children altogether, because:
·	 Everything they do not spend on their children they can spend on themselves,
·	 By saving money on raising children they will not only have more income, but also 
much more time, part of which can be spent on money-earning activities through 
which the income available to spend on themselves can be further increased.
·	 Although giving up children can lead to a certain emotional deficit, such individuals 
suffer no financial disadvantage, and in fact enjoy the advantage that the increase 
in contributions they can make (in relation to the higher income derived from 
the extra work they are able to perform instead of raising children) will mean in 
terms of a larger pension when they retire, compared to those who were unable 
to eliminate their (rationally unjustified) child-raising instincts. People who have 
children can expect nothing in return from the children they have raised, and in 
fact experience shows that they will have to continue supporting their children 
even in old age, meaning this is another added advantage of this strategy.
However, it is obvious that if many people choose this strategy then by the time 
they reach old age there will be very few taxpayers whose social contributions can 
be distributed in the form of pensions. In view of the fact that we described this 
strategy as an intrinsic reaction to a situation in which there are not enough children, 
it serves as positive feedback and further aggravates the basic problem, although at 
the community level, not the individual.
Collective strategies – the possibility of a compromise
At a community level, the above-mentioned strategies clearly serve to worsen an 
already bad situation, and accordingly it is expedient to try to create some kind of 
collective strategy; i.e., to force a new social contract through a process of bargaining. 
But what arguments or trump cards do young people have in this bargaining? What 
is it worth targeting at all? Does a compromise exist that could be viewed by both 
parties as equitable?
At first glance, in a democratic society young people are at a disadvantage in 
such a deal, because as a result of ageing, politicians are increasingly inclined to 
take into account the point of view of the older generation, not only because are they 
the largest and most rapidly increasing group of voters, but also because they are 
the most active part of the electorate. Elections have been lost in Hungary because 
of the rational reduction of pensions, and elections have also been won thanks to 
promises made primarily to pensioners. And this takes us in a direction in which the 
6 In her 2005 study, Mária Augusztinovics argues that ageing is not a problem for now, because the increase in the number of old 
people is occurring parallel to the decrease in the number of children, and although the old-age dependency rate is increasing, 
the proportion of young people is decreasing. Accordingly, the total dependency rate is still lower that it was in the previous 
century (which was characterised by a large number of children).
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burdens on the younger generations are continuously increasing as a result of ageing, 
while their opportunities for achieving a deal of a political nature are continuously 
decreasing, leaving them only with individual opportunities to opt out and desert 
the system, such as emigration.
However, at a second glance, if we do not consider those who are already 
pensioners and who are unable to change their situation themselves (and must 
accordingly rely on politics, and for whom as a result it is rational to exploit the 
instruments for applying political pressure), but instead consider those who are not 
yet pensioners, then there opens up a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in 
terms of bargaining. This is because – if their attention is drawn to the fact in time –, 
it should not be impossible to get people who are currently middle aged to realise that 
if they follow the example of the present older generation when they too retire, then 
they will only be forcing more young people who pay social security contributions 
to desert en masse, due to which contributions will have to be increased, which in 
turn will create even greater impetus for young people to opt out. And the end result 
will be that, despite their power to exert political pressure, pensions will still not 
be high enough. This end result can be avoided through the timely conclusion of 
a new deal with regard to the future and an equitable distribution of burdens. So 
this bargain would come about between the middle-aged and the young, and would 
affect transfers between future active workers and old people. Of the generations 
affected, even old people are still young enough to adapt to the new situation. But for 
the acceptance of the young people of the future, who are unable to take part in its 
development either because they are too young or have not yet been born, it must be 
well-founded from the beginning; a deal that is regarded as fair by all parties. What 
would a deal of this kind look like?
Collective strategies – searching for an equitable deal
Such a deal would fundamentally involve today’s middle-aged active workers – the 
old people of the future – foregoing certain transfers from the active workers of the 
future, meaning they would have to reduce their old-age income that is derived from 
this source, and (partly) assume responsibility for the payment of certain expenses 
(e.g. healthcare) that are currently also (mainly) paid instead of them by active 
workers.
This very roughly determined principle is logical, but what level would both 
parties regard as equitable?
An opportunity for a practical deal 
A practical solution that lacks all theoretical considerations can be envisioned 
by taking a look at the past level of transfers from active workers to the older 
generation, and determining the observed level which we still regard as bearable 
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today. The two most important financial transfers from active workers to old people 
are pension contributions and health insurance contributions; the other elements 
are smaller and difficult to express in numbers (such as, for instance, savings on 
travel for pensioners).
According to figures from the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance 
(see ONYF [2016]):
Table 3: Pension Insurance Fund contribution rates as a percentage of earnings serving as 
basis for contribution - %
Pension insurance 
contribution paid 
by
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
employers 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,5 24,0 24,0 22,0 22,0 20,0 18,0 18,0 18,0
the insured 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 7,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,5 8,5
Total 30,5 30,5 30,5 30,5 30,0 31,0 30,0 30,0 28,0 26,0 26,5 26,5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
employers 18,0 18,0 21,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 24,0 27,0 26,0 23,1
the insured 8,5 8,5 8,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0
Total 26,5 26,5 29,5 33,5 33,5 33,5 34,0 34,0 37,0 36,0 33,1
The National Health Insurance Fund (OEP) only publish data as a percentage of GDP (OEP [2016])
Table 4: Changes in National Health Insurance Fund expenditure as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
7,7 7,2 6,3 6,1 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,4 7,0 6,9 7,1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
7,0 6,5 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,3 6,3 6,2 6,0 5,8
This indicates that – at least in Hungary – the two values have fluctuated around a 
significantly high level during the past two decades, and accordingly we might state 
that the above-mentioned “past figure” could easily be equal to the current figure, 
which we could then freeze as a result.
However, we also know that the above two elements are not homogeneous: 
while in pay-as-you-go pension systems such as Hungary’s pension contributions 
exclusively burden active workers and exclusively serve the consumption of old 
people, healthcare contributions may also exclusively burden active workers, but also 
partly serve their healthcare consumption. However, we also know that old people 
use healthcare services to a proportionally greater extent, meaning healthcare 
contributions must increase for two reasons as a result of ageing. Accordingly, 
freezing healthcare contributions for active workers would mean that old people 
would also have to pay such contributions (and moreover, increasing contributions) 
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for a long period, meaning the proportion of their pensions that can be spent on other 
things would decrease. It is already visible in the above OECD data that healthcare 
consumption by older people is much higher than by younger generations. This is 
also confirmed by the Hungarian data:
Figure 6: OEP healthcare expenditure in relation to one thousand citizens of identical age, 2010
Source: Lecture by Gyula Kincses, 2017, OEP
Accordingly, freezing the part of healthcare contributions that serves for the 
healthcare consumption of old people would mean that the increasing deficit in the 
financing of healthcare services for the old would have to be paid for out of pensions. 
This would lead to a reduction in pensions. If this is something that future pensioners 
can see in advance, then they can prepare for it through planned savings, with which 
they can supplement their pensions. In other words, they can capitalise part of their 
pension services. Overall, and from a functional perspective, this is the same as if 
they were to capitalise part of the collateral for their healthcare insurance services, 
and this can be formally organised in this manner.
But the pensions of old people in the future (or at least, the part that is derived 
from currently active workers) also decreases because we are freezing their pension 
payments while ageing continues, leading to the following situation: the number 
of active workers paying social security contributions decreases, leading to a 
reduction in the total sum of contributions paid into the system, which in turn 
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must be distributed among an increasing number of old-age pensioners. Old people 
can defend against the resulting reduction in pensions in two ways: first through a 
continuous increase in the age of retirement, and second, through savings, which is 
equivalent to the further partial funding of the pension system. Increasing lifespans 
mean that for pensions not to be reduced, retirement age must be increased by a 
greater level than the expected increase in lifespan, or in other words, in a way that 
means the average time spent as a pensioner continuously decreases.
This practical solution may seem viable at first glance, but there are a few problems, 
including but not limited to the following two, which I would like to highlight here:
1. Since this solution is not based on principle, we cannot be sure that it will be 
permanent. It may seem equitable now, according to our current experience, but 
this is fundamentally subjective; we cannot be sure that upcoming generations 
will feel the same. As a result, we can never be sure that the upcoming generation 
will not withdraw from this agreement.
2. It is clearly unfair with regard to women who raise children, because they will 
receive less and less from the continuously decreasing distributable pension 
money in view of the fact that, in contrast to men, they have spent a significant 
part of their active working years raising their children and not performing 
earning activities that include the payment of social contributions. This has, 
of course, always been the case, but there have so far been additional resources 
available to compensate for this, which will later dwindle and eventually run out. 
In addition, it will become increasingly evident that people are only entitled to a 
pension because they have raised the next generation of contributors. And it is 
precisely those who have contributed the most to this who will benefit the least.
At first glance, we could handle this situation by examining the fundamental 
philosophy behind the current pensions system and returning to its strict, 
“fundamentalist” interpretation. This, with a few amendments, could provide a 
solution to these problems.
The fundamentalist solution
The pay-as-you-go pension system was eventually underpinned by a philosophy – 
much later than its practical introduction – by Samuelson (1958). This was welcomed 
with joy by the system’s practical implementers, because until then they had had the 
bad feeling that they were operating a gigantic Ponzi scheme (Blackburn [2003]). 
This bad feeling was dispelled by Samuelson, and everyone calmed down (although 
the bad feeling was justified and should not have been dispelled, but rather further 
reinforced, as has now transpired – but more about that later!).
According to Samuelson, it used to be the case that children took care of their 
ageing parents in exchange for having been brought up by them (“traditional 
pension system”), but this has now gone out of fashion. Because of this, consecutive 
generations concluded a Hobbes-Rousseau social contract. According to the 
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agreement, current active workers pay for the upkeep of current pensioners, and in 
return the active workers of the future will also pay for their upkeep. Furthermore, 
old people will also receive a kind of “biological” interest, meaning their pensions 
will be higher than the sum they paid into the system, because the increasing 
population means there will be more active workers paying social contributions than 
there are old people, and the additional contributions of these active workers will 
also be distributed among current pensioners. This philosophy was widely adopted 
(although not strictly adhered to in the sense that contribution payments were not 
generally defined, but instead the level of pensions was somehow determined and 
contributions were then continuously adapted to this level), and only one major 
amendment was included. This was put forward in a short article by Aaron in 1966, 
who said that the biological interest should also be supplemented by the effect of 
increased productivity. Although Samuelson concentrated on the likely population 
increase, he did note that it follows from the model that if (in an extreme case) the 
population were to fall, then biological interest would be negative.
In other words, freezing pension contributions at an acceptable level and only 
paying pensioners a pension that corresponds to the contributions paid corresponds 
to the original philosophy of the pay-as-you-go pension system, except this principle 
has generally not been followed so far. Accordingly, the first failing of the above-
mentioned practical solution can be remedied, and the solution is not difficult to 
find: we must simply return to the official philosophy of the pay-as-you-go pension 
system; we need only put a stop to the lenient practices employed until now and 
adhere strictly to the official philosophy. Demand for the fundamentalist approach 
has increased steadily with the worsening of the demographic situation, meaning 
the setting of contribution levels and the introduction of the equitable distribution 
of gradually dwindling pension resources. And with regard to the fall in pensions, 
their distribution cannot be handled with the same ‘laxity” as before, but must 
be well-justified. Moreover, according to the original philosophy put forward by 
Samuelson, such a justification is the fact that pensions shall be in proportion to the 
total contributions paid by the individual until they retire, which accordingly must 
be recorded (in a valorised manner, although this was defined by another Nobel 
prize winner, Buchanan [1968]). This kind of pension system is called an individual 
account, or NDC (notional defined-contribution) system, and for a long time I too 
felt that this was the right direction for pension reforms (Banyár-Mészáros [2003], 
Banyár-Gál-Mészáros [2010]).
We have thus turned the above-mentioned practical solution into a for-the-
most-part theoretical solution, and have eliminated its first major shortcoming. The 
second shortcoming is also relatively easy to eliminate (and our proposals for reform 
mentioned above include the original proposals that harmonise well with the logic 
of the NDC system): in this solution, pension entitlements acquired during marriage 
would be regarded as joint entitlements in view of the fact that a kind of distribution 
Review of Sociology, 2017/476
of labour existed between the married couple within the family, with one partner 
staying at home with the children while the other worked. This means that income 
and the related acquisition of pension entitlements are a joint acquisition, which must 
be distributed equally. One embodiment of this could be a joint life pension annuity 
based on this joint acquisition of pension entitlements (I will not go into detail here, 
but the specifics can be found in the above-mentioned articles).
So it would seem that demand for the introduction of an NDC pension system, and 
with it a return to the basic principles established by Samuelson, would solve almost 
every problem, but unfortunately this is not the case. This is because if we imagine 
a pay-as-you-go pension system reformed as above, according to fundamentalist 
principles, while negative demographic trends continue, them we are faced with the 
following problems:
1. First of all, we have as yet not found a theoretical answer concerning the appropriate 
definition of pension contributions; all we know is that defining a set value is a 
theoretical solution. And in the case of a population decline, defining pension 
contributions at a high level is much more problematic than if the population is 
increasing.
2. In this case, the youth of today knows that if the population continues to decline, 
then their pensions will be even less that the reduced pensions of today’s older 
generation. In other words, if we regard their contributions as payments into the 
system, as suggested by Samuelson, then the (“biological”) interest rate on those 
payments will be negative, meaning it is in their interest to continue to “sabotage” 
this system and use every possible opportunity to opt out and desert. Simply put, 
the Samuelson system may not work as effectively with a negative rate of interest 
as with a positive interest rate, meaning the two cases are not symmetrical, 
especially in view of the fact that the original principle would only be introduced 
as a result of a negative interest rate. While the rate was positive, meaning while 
the population was indeed increasing, it was not in fact the biological interest rate 
that was positive, but it was rather the rate of contributions that was set to such 
a low level. Meaning that, in contrast to the system’s philosophy, it was not the 
pensioners of the era who enjoyed the most benefits, but active workers.
3. Furthermore, a fundamentalist reform or a transition to the NDC system would 
not have the same effect in developed countries with poor demographics as it would 
in moderately developed countries like Hungary. In highly developed countries, 
problems that are coming to a head as a result of a strongly negative (“biological”) 
interest rate can be delayed for a long time by encouraging young people to emigrate 
there from moderately developed countries, in view of the fact that, despite the 
low number of children, developed countries can acquire new social security 
contributions. This also corresponds with the intention of young people to desert 
periphery countries, meaning such migration is in the joint interests of young 
people from both highly developed countries and moderately developed countries. 
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Although the price of this is that pension problems become even more severe in 
moderately developed countries (“positive feedback”), according to Samuelson’s 
philosophy this is something we should not be concerned with. In fact, in this 
case the philosophy directly affirms their interests, because it states that source 
countries are not owed anything in return for the emigration of young people. 
This may be something that we may increasingly state only in bad faith, but we 
should not harbour illusions; this is a position that developed countries will hold. 
And in fact the mechanism of operation of the European Union, and especially 
the principle of the free movement of labour, is assisting them in this (See Banyár 
[2014b]). This means that, even in the event of a fundamentalist reform of the 
pension system, in Hungary the pension problem would reach breaking point 
much earlier than in more developed countries.
4. Finally, from one perspective the family approach described above solves the 
problem of unfairness with respect to women with children, which we mentioned 
as one of the problems associated with the possibility of a practical deal, but it 
also increases unfairness from a another perspective. This is because people with 
children (including men) will suffer a reduction in pensions compared to actively 
working men who do not start a family and generate a similar level of pension 
contributions. Accordingly, the question arises whether it is equitable for parents 
who have in effect undertaken to provide a new generation of social security 
contributors to be paid lower pensions than those who have not done so. In essence, 
we could ask a similar question with relation to one-way migration between highly 
developed and moderately developed countries.
As we can see, one option, a return to Samuelson’s principles, represents a highly 
doubtful solution. Accordingly, neither the practical/pragmatic solution, nor a solution 
based on old principles will be effective.
New principle: the equitable settlement of accounts between generations
So we have reached a stage where we need a theoretical solution, but the old principle 
does not work very well; it was developed incorrectly. So what next? What is the right 
strategy for young people to take? Should they strive to do away with the current 
pension system after all, in view of the fact that within a Samuelson framework and 
in a worsening demographic situation, topped with an environment that is draining 
labour out of the country, they can only be the losers of the pay-as-you-go system, 
whether it is reformed or not?! Are young people right to be resentful with regard to 
the social contract that is currently in effect, and which is disadvantageous to them, 
and are they justified in refusing to maintain the current older generation on the 
grounds that they are certain to lose out on the deal?
For my part I believe that (possible, or future) resentment on the part of young 
people is justified, but only to a certain extent. Only to a certain extent because 
young people cannot claim that they are supporting old people for nothing in view 
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of the fact that they have received a lot from them, and owe them a lot to begin 
with. And the fact that old people are asking for something in return for what young 
people owe them is not in conflict with any fairness-related problem. But what do 
young people owe the old? Practically speaking, they owe them the cost of their 
upbringing, because that is something to which they contributed practically nothing. 
In addition, the human capital owned by the child, and which generates income for 
them, was created thanks to the financial efforts of the parents (and to a certain 
extent, other taxpayers). These efforts can thus in fact be regarded as, investments 
in human capital, with regard to which it is justified to expect not only a simple 
return, but perhaps also a positive yield. These investments were not made by the 
child, so it is not a justified demand that the former should receive the full yield, and 
should not have to return something of it to those who did make the investment. We 
could also approach things from the perspective that the child invested in his/her 
own human capital, but using a loan from their parents and other taxpayers, and it 
is appropriate that this loan should be repaid when the individual is able to do so.
It is interesting to note that Samuelson writes nothing about this aspect 
of things; in his approach children have no consumption, meaning they have 
contributed zero investment to child-rearing, which naturally has a yield of zero 
(he more or less explicitly states exactly this!). This is all the more strange in view 
of the fact that he mentions the motive itself, because he states that this is exactly 
what happened within the “traditional pension system”, which has “gone out of 
fashion”: children supported their parents in exchange for having been brought 
up. In defence of Samuelson, it may be stated that the idea of investing in human 
capital was only put forward a little later than his description of his own pension 
philosophy. Nevertheless, it is strange that the theory has not been corrected since 
then.7 These days we take everything into consideration, but only party consider our 
most important investment, the one in human capital, although pensions are the 
yield on this investment. If there is no investment, there is no pension. Pensions 
can only be as high as is permitted by this investment (and this is something that 
even Samuelson noticed and mentioned in his 1958 article, but only in very general 
terms).
The fact that we do not take account of the investment in human capital means 
that we are potentially allowing that capital to escape from us without settling 
7 I have attempted to perform this theoretical correction myself (Banyár [2014a]). The theoretical correction results in a pension 
system, as also described here, that was already “invented” 10 years earlier without any theoretical consideration by four 
authors working (at the time) for a Czech-Dutch insurance company (Hylz et al [2005]). It is important to note that, although 
they do make a positive contribution to the topic, I regard the majority of views concerning the subject of “children and 
insurance” as a side-track from a theoretical perspective, because of what I regard as the question having been put forward 
incorrectly. The question that was put forward is: how can fertility rates be increased via the pension system? This arose 
from the correct observation that the current pension system is a disincentive to having children (see e.g. Gál [2003]), but the 
reversal of the question seems arbitrary, because why should the pension system be required to promote childbearing? This is 
what those who objected to the idea concentrated on (for instance, in Kovács’s [ed.] volume [2012]), because this was how the 
proponents of the idea (and especially the Botos’s, e.g. Botos-Botos [2011]) communicated it. But even the impartial analysts 
felt that this approach was self-evident (e.g. Regős [2015], Simonovits [2014]). My standpoint is that the pension system must be 
impartial with regard to this question of fertility, and I deduce the required reforms from deeper financial relationships rather 
than from the perspective of fertility rates. 
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accounts. (Although, as I have already mentioned above, developed countries are 
happy about this [for the moment] and are in no rush to settle accounts, and in fact 
are shaming those who want this.)
So what we have found is that a correct solution that could be justified in the long 
term would be for the generations to simply settle accounts with each other8, with 
the young repaying the costs of their upbringing to those to whom they owe it when 
they are capable of paying, meaning when the investment in their human capital 
“bears fruit”; i.e., when they become active workers. This means that young people 
should only resent the fact that the old are demanding money from them to the 
extent that this demand exceeds the valorised costs of their own upbringing (and 
perhaps a little yield on that investment).
Accordingly, the principle could be set down (in its initial, draft form) as follows: 
we take into account the average cost of raising a contributor (individual differences 
do not matter as long as they do not cause an increase in human capital), and the 
repayment of this investment is required by all young people (at some point in 
the future, at a suitable stage of their lives). The money that enters the system in 
this manner is then distributed in the form of pensions to those to whom these 
young people belong, meaning to those who have contributed to the creation of this 
contribution capacity, and in a proportion that corresponds to their investment. 
Young people do not owe everyone, meaning it is not their responsibility to maintain 
all old people. They primarily owe their parents (if, as is true in the majority of cases, 
they raised them; if not then they owe a debt to those who in fact raised them), and 
secondarily to those who supported their upbringing though paying taxes. The latter 
is a difficult issue, but not impossible to solve; it may be estimated to a relatively good 
degree. For instance, we may state that the sum with which people have contributed 
relative to the raising of the next generation is roughly proportionate to personal 
income tax that is paid. And we can calculate the absolute value by multiplying this 
sum with the part of the cost of raising a child that was financed through taxes. This 
includes, for instance, childcare allowance, state education, public healthcare, etc.
This also means that this contribution is something that young people owe, meaning 
they cannot demand a pension in exchange for repaying it. This in turn also means 
that the Samuelson principle of distributing the total sum of pension contributions 
paid into the system into individual pensions is wrong, meaning what counts is not 
what contributions the individual has paid, but to what extent they have contributed 
(directly or indirectly, through paying taxes) to generating new contributors. In other 
words, individuals are not eligible for a pension simply because they have paid pension 
contributions, although they must receive something in return for having contributed 
to the raising of a new generation of contributors through paying taxes.
8 At this point, many will be reminded of the Kotlikoff-Auerbach theory of “generational accounting”, which is concerned with 
problems that are to a certain extent similar. However, my approach differs from theirs, which primarily concentrates on the 
total tax paid by the various generations. In contrast, I concentrate only on how much the individual generations owe each 
other, which only represents part of tax revenue, and also includes a host of services of a non-tax nature.
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All this together represents a new social contract and a new pension system, which, 
however, is still lacking some elements in this current form. People who decide not 
to have children will receive a considerably lower pension compared to the present 
level; this is the price for reducing the burden on future generations to an equitable 
level. However, it is important to note that people who do not raise children, either 
because they never wanted to, or because “things didn’t work out”, have also saved (in 
the main) the money they would have otherwise spent on raising a family,9 and if they 
do not need to immediately spend the money they have saved as a result, they can put 
it aside. And if they do put it aside, and, for instance, the state facilitates this with 
a targeted savings construction, then they can use this money to supplement their 
pensions.
We may state that a pension system based on these new principles would not be a 
pay-as-you-go system, but rather a partly-funded system. Although, if we view things 
from the perspective of content, then as a bad, Samuelson construction we can forget 
about the idea of a “pay-as-you-go” system, because the descendent of this system will 
represent nothing other than an investment in human capital. In other words, the 
new pension system would be fully funded, but participants can chose – freely, within 
certain constraints – whether to primarily invest their capital in human or “physical” 
capital, or perhaps in both, to ensure that they have an old-age pension. This also 
provides a measure of what they can expect to receive in old age, and why.
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